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-- with regard to Soviet antisubmarine capabilities, it assumes our POLARIS/POSEIDON submarines will remain invulnerable through

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
•	our POLA	RIS/POSEIDON submarines will ren	nain invulnerable through
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NSC review completed.

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	25X1			į	vhich give very	
	•	serious pause	to this optimistic judgment	;	· 25X1 -	•
ż	•	with	regard to Soviet capabilities	s against ou	r bombers, it	
	!		Inerability of SAC bases to			
	•		nes operating off U.S. show ourse intercept, and does n			
			which may indicate an imp			25X1
		air defense ca				
		4b - 70	TD since the second of			
			TE gives the appearance of of "operational" considerati			
		(For example,	it assumes without detaile	d examinati	on the survivab	ility
	-		ommand and control appara data regarding U. S. silo ha		epts optimistic	25X1
		and unproven	data regarding 0. 5. SHO na	aremess.		
			criticisms may be best illu			
			ence which contrasts with N			
		penetrability.	ICBM accuracy, POLARIS	Ammerapm	y, and U.S. be	omber
		•		•		
		Soviet ICBM A	ccuracy		•	
		The hard data	on both the presently deplo	yed Soviet I	CBM force and	the
	25X1	new Soviet ICI	3Ms does not allow any conf			
	1	of accuracy.				
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÷	05)44	•				
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		Concerning the	e new Soviet ICBMs the S	SS-18 and SS	5-19 -	<u> </u>
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			One would expect, as i	n the case o	of the U.S. sys	tems.
	•		culties would be worked ou tems are deployed in large	t in the nex!	few years, pro	ppaply
		before the sys	come are debroked in rarge	ridinger 5.		25 <b>X</b> 1
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· [		The	difference between t	the MIE
	assessment and the equivalent to an alm	possible greater accu	racy suggested here	in is
	SLBM Survivability	possible greater accunost 10-fold increase i	m erorostae errect on	25X
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	or one oppositioned i	t there should be little low or in the next 10 y	As we This are a	
	partially upon U. S.	superiority in "class	ical" ASW technique	on is based.
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25X1	The Soviets are purs	uing at least	A CTAN	
	very aggressive fash	ion. It is very possible not yet realized by t	ASW program ole that this technologies he U. S. R&D comm	
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Since we cannot plan on always getting solid intelligence, it may be a very long time before we are able to determine the nature of these new threats. Under these circumstances, it is imprudent to make judgmental conclusions that minimize the potential for a technological breakthrough for the next ten years and thus future Soviet capabilities in this vital area.  Bomber Penetration
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breakthrough for the next ten years and thus future Soviet capabilities in this vital area.  Bomber Penetration
Bomber Penetration
The conclusion that the Soviet air defenses today are relatively ineffec-
tive against the planned U. S. low-altitude bomber strikes is based
on a large amount of intelligence information which suggests two defi- ciencies.
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While both of these conclusions may be justified by information collected
in the past, data is beginning to emerge which suggests a potential for
marked change within the period of the estimate. Specifically, Soviet
homeland air defense practice altered significantly about 1972.
The above change may also reflect an improving capability against low
altitude penetrators in a number of other areas where there are intel-
ligence gaps,
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For the longer term, many Soviet activities seen at their R&N factition
are not fully understood.
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Taken as a whole, the uncertainties inherent in a comprehensive assessment of Soviet air defense capabilities do not support the NIE view that ". . . it is unlikely that the Soviets will be able to cope with sophisticated low altitude attacks during the next 10 years."

Having identified what we believe to be serious deficiencies in this NIE, there follows a series of observations examining the nature of the problems and some suggestions for their resolution.

## Observations on the Intelligence Estimating Process

The root cause of the problems experienced both by the intelligence community and the users of intelligence is the lack of factual evidence and the difficulty of forecasting ten years into the future. Because of the importance attached to some intelligence subjects, there is an understandable desire to fill some of the intelligence holes with judgments. These judgments can then gain an acceptance approaching fact, and can then lead both the intelligence community and the users of intelligence into a single viewpoint which rejects alternatives, and can persist too long. Only when some surprise arises, totally contrary to the intelligence trend, is the pattern broken and another "review" ordered of the intelligence effort.

When decisions must be made, they are almost always based on incomplete information. When they involve intelligence information, the decision-maker should wish to know not only the facts but also the best judgments of the intelligence community and have some feeling for the uncertainties connected with these conclusions, including other possible situations consistent with the data. These uncertainties should lead the decision-maker to consider whether he should hedge his bets or to be prepared for possible reverses connected with failures of actions (or inactions) based on these assessments.

This is not an easy process; no one knows how to weigh judgmental uncertainties. For this reason we look upon the process of attempting

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
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to analyze and communicate uncertainties in the area of national assessment as a process with which we must continue to experiment, trying various modes in an attempt to find a more satisfactory procedure. This leads us to the following suggestions:

## Suggestions for Resolving Observed Deficiencies

I. Those aspects of intelligence which are considered critical by key decision-makers should be subject to separate and competitive analyses and such alternate views as are developed should be presented to the President and other users. In our view, this suggestion deserves the highest priority for consideration and implementation.

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The purpose of this suggestion is to try to maintain an awareness of the limitations in the intelligence information. In addition, it stimulates the user to provide important feedback to the intelligence community on his interests and problems which, in turn, can motivate the intelligence community to provide a more complete and useful product to the user.

a net assessment, that is, to include an assessment of U. S. capabilities in the face of the threat in question. We suggest that the National Security Council adopt a three-step process. The first step is the generation of a purely intelligence document, the NIE, which carefully avoids the impression that a net assessment has been performed. The second step would involve a genuine net assessment, requiring participation by both the intelligence community and other agencies (Department of Defense, State, etc.), under the aegis of the NSC. The third and final step would involve a thorough critique of the net assessment document for the NSC by an entity which is enabled to function with an appropriate degree of independence.

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## Summary

We believe that the policy-maker would be better served by an NIE which clearly identifies that which is fact and that which is judgment, and which identifies the intelligence gaps prevailing at various stages in the analytic process. The product would also be more useful if the decision-makers provided more specific guidance regarding the relevant, contemporary issues with which they are confronted, and on the most useful format for presentation of the intelligence.

Finally, Mr. President, we recommend that you direct the NSC to implement these suggestions, insofar as possible, with respect to formulation of this year's NIE on Soviet Strategic Forces which is now in progress and, as appropriate, to the national intelligence estimating process.

Respectfully,

George W. Anderson, Jr. Admiral, USN (Ret.) Chairman

The President . . The White House Washington, D. C.

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